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Summary findings
Developing viable new business is critical to recovery and  knowhow benefits can be disseminated at
long-term growth, especially in transition economies.  proportionately  low additional cost. Any subsidy for an
There  has been a long history of public support of  intervention should be temporary  and should be phased
enterprise development, starting with centralized state  out when the main objective of intervention is
agency initiatives but moving more recently to  achieved-that  is, when the market takes off.
decentralized instruments for development of the  Grants should generally be for knowhow, not for
business services market.  equipment. There may be a case for unbundling the
The window of time during which the benefits of  knowhow component of loans (including feasibility
intervention are likely to be greatest: when a market is in  studies and follow-up expert services)  for grant funding.
its infancy and its development is constrained by  A package combining loans and grants-through  a single
uncertainty and lack of information. Interventions for  financial institution or through separate institutions-
enterprise support should be demand-responsive and  may work, provided safeguards can be put in place to
flexibly organized. In some circumstances, centralized  prevent perverse use of grants.
assistance may still be effective, but it is generally better  The matching grant model, which is used increasingly
to use competitive private service providers responding  in the World Bank and elsewhere, is one solution-but  it
to enterprises'  changing needs. The main task is to  must be justified and carefully designed. After evaluating
stimulate the private services sector, improving its  ten matching grant funds, Phillips concludes that
capacity to respond to the demands of new and  performance is mixed. Best practice models are needed.
expanding private enterprises.  Ensuring economic benefits requires proactive
Support for enterprises has tended to be either free or  management with clear objectives of market facilitation
heavily subsidized. But such subsidies can be justified  ("making a market"). And it requires a balance between
only if interventions efficiently supply public goods.  rapid grant approval procedures and careful selection of
Providing technical and management knowhow can be a  services for grants.
public good if it generates externalities-if,  for example,
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IMPLEMENTING  THE MARKET APPROACH  TO ENTERPRISE
SUPPORT: AN EVALUATION OF TEN MATCHING  GRANT SCHEMES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
i.  The development of viable new business, especially in transitional economies, is critical to
recovery and long term growth. Yet in many economies the enterprise sector (especially SMEs) is faced
with macroeconomic constraints, numerous regulatory and institutional hurdles, and operational
bottlenecks. Enterprise support interventions try to address these problems. The menu of  interventions
ranges from macro-economic management through institutional and regulatory change, to firm-level
finance, technical and management assistance. The Bank has used many types of interventions over many
years, including enterprise-level support in rural and urban areas and at micro-, SME- and larger scale.
The effectiveness of such micro-level interventions cannot be separated from the broader policy, and the
broader policy cannot be successful without enterprise- level interventions. This study however focuses
on the micro level, i.e how to effectively provide enterprise development assistance.
ii.  Public support to promote enterprise since the 1970s in developing countries has moved from
centralized state development agency initiatives to decentralized market development instruments. It is
now increasingly agreed that, if it is to be economically efficient and practically effective, technical
assistance for the enterprise sector needs to be flexibly organized and demand-responsive. While
traditional centralized assistance may continue to be effective in some circumstances, assistance needs to
be to a large extent moved out of the State or quasi-public agencies to  competitive private service
providers responding to the evolving needs of client enterprises, subject to service quality control.
Stimulation of private service supply and upgrading its capacity to respond to the demands of new and
expanding private enterprises is therefore a central task of public policy. Such concerns have been the
focus of a series of international workshops on business development services (BDS) held during 1999
and 2000 under the auspices of the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development.'
iii.  Public sector enterprise support has in the past been either free or heavily subsidized. But such
subsidies can only be justified if it can be shown that the interventions efficiently supply public goods.
Technical and management know-how provision is potentially likely to be a public good if it generates
externalities - for example if its value can be increased through knowledge dissemination without
incurring proportional additional financial cost. In such a case there may be a justification for subsidized
intervention to support faster and more effective development of the market for business knowledge. In
practice implicit subsidies have been provided through traditional State agency support, and to a lesser
extent through the fee-for-service autonomous public agency model. While these models may continue to
be valid in some cases, such interventions on the supply side have been problematic because, inter alia,
they may run the risk of missing the main market needs while actually undercutting sustainable domestic
capacity and having only a weak effect on service demand. Such an outcome would be counter-
developmental and would mean that, instead of providing a public good, the subsidy actually made
matters worse.
The conferences  were  held in Hanoi,  Rio De Janeiro  and Harare.  Their  outcome  is summarized  in J. Levitsky
(ed) 'Business  Development  Services;  A Review  of International  Experience  ITP 2000;  implementation  policy  is
summarized  in: 'Business  Development  Services  for Small  Enterprises:  Guidelines  for Donor  Intervention'  -
Committee  of Donor  Agencies  for Small  Enterprise  Development.  November  2000.ii
iv.  If subsidies are justified, then instead of implicit subsidies to a single supplier, or centrally
selected suppliers, grants targeted to service buyers combined with cost recovery (via service fees or co-
payments), are likely to be more efficient because they stimulate a competitive response from existing and
new independent providers of business services. Grants targeted not directly to the buying and selling of
services, but to 'non-transactional' activities such as provision of public information or development of
upgraded services, might be more efficient still because they do not distort buying and selling decisions.
But carefully designed intervention in transactions might have inherent dynamic benefits. As well as
being better targeted, grants are also likely to be easier to phase out at an appropriate time than subsidies
to State agencies.
V.  Grants for equipment rather than knowledge are not easily  justified on public goods grounds, but
to reduce effective cost of investing there may be a case for 'unbundling' equipment loans. The
software/know-how  components (e.g. feasibility studies, on-the-job training, start-up and follow-up
expert services) could, subject to certain conditions, be provided through grants, helping to reduce the
effective cost of finance. A combined loan/grant package, either through a single financial institution or
through other institutions working in tandem with the banks, might be justified provided that there are
appropriate safeguards.
Vi.  Whether a grant window is made available jointly with a credit or is implemented as a free-
standing instrument, best practice models are needed. The matching grant fund (MGF) is an instrument
increasingly widely used in the Bank and outside which may be the best available approach. An
evaluation of ten MGFs is carried out in this paper. The conclusion on performance of this instrument,
based on a variety of indicators, is however mixed. While the output benefits of such schemes (expressed
as export- or sales-multiples of the grant amounts) appear to have been good, sustainability and impact
seem to have been weaker. Operating costs have in some cases tended to be high and implementation has
in some cases been complicated and delayed, calling into question their ability to inject liquidity rapidly,
and efficiently, into the service market.
vii.  Another grant-type model has been based on vouchers, especially for business training. Voucher
instruments are in principle similar to MGFs but they provide a currency of payment for services which
may better reduce both supplier and user risk, thus providing a greater market stimulus. However, they
have relatively complex management requirements and correspondingly  high operation costs, needed to
provide successful coordination, guard against fraud, and ensure high quality service provision. The Bank
has not implemented enough of these projects to draw firm lessons yet.
viii.  The mixed evaluations suggest that MGFs have to be carefully  justified in terms of additionality,
and more carefully designed, if they are to be cost-effective and to achieve their potential market-making
impact. Above all, because the more decentralized is the approach the greater the overall project
management burden for the facilitating agency, a key requirement is competent fund management with
clear objectives and procedures and a proactive market-making stance aimed at both providers and users
in transactional and in non-transactional assistance. MGFs also have to balance streamlined procedures
which allow rapid response to clients, with the need to ensure that grants are targeted to economically
viable subprojects. Experience also suggests that MGFs are most likely to produce net economic benefits
if they target the SME rather than the larger enterprise sector.
ix.  Given the fact that many donor-driven public sector service providers are in existence, the
question arises of whether and how to best leverage their capacity. There may be an acceptable combined
facilitator-provider model. Such a combination could create a conflict of interest, because provision could
undermine facilitation. However, in practice intelligent managing of a combined approach could work ifiii
the service-provider function focused on specific specialized services not available domestically, was
oriented to training and dissemination, and was to be phased out pari passu with the increase in domestic
capacity, according to a clear timetable and an agreed market development model.1
IMPLEMENTING  THE MARKET APPROACH  TO ENTERPRISE SUPPORT:
AN EVALUATION OF TEN MATCHING GRANT SCHEMES
I.  THE NEED FOR ENTERPRISE SUPPORT
Alternative Policy Approaches
1.1  The Bank's approach to assistance to the enterprise sector has increasingly focussed on the
competitive and incentive environment and the institutional and regulatory framework. Interventions at
the firm level have moved away from fixed investment (e.g. through financial intermediary loans) to
knowledge transfer and business support services. 2 Firm-level interventions are justified if broader policy
interventions by themselves do not create conditions adequate for enterprise development, while, at the
same time, (i) private markets do not adequately provide the firm-level inputs needed and, (ii) enterprises
are able to use efficiently the public sector inputs that are provided. 3
1.2  This paper is concerned with micro-interventions;  it therefore makes the assumption that the
above two conditions hold, at least in a significant number of economies and in a significant number of
situations. The paper is concerned with how such interventions can be made more cost effective in terns
of sustainability and development impact by targeting the existing capacity within an economy to provide
business services to enterprises.
SME constraints and development policy
1.3  Entrepreneurs in developing and transitional  economies face a triple burden of macroeconomic,
institutional/regulatory,  and micro- (firm level) constraints. Many new enterprises fail as a result of the
excessive costs of entry relative to their fragile financial positions at startup, or inability to secure permits,
access finance or obtain business! technical support, while others fail because of high costs of operation,
such as the cost of servicing debt, inaccessible business information (e.g. how to export), and either
burdensome state regulation (e.g. onerous tax compliance) or inadequate state regulation (e.g. weak
contract enforcement). These hurdles are particularly problematic for SMEs.
1.4  Up to the 1960s the share of SMEs in output in OECD countries had been falling, a trend that was
seen generally as the inevitable and probably desirable consequence of the development of economies of
scale. However, the start of the 1970s saw a reappraisal of their role, boosted as a result of the oil-price
led recession of the 1970s when SME entrants were considered to be playing an important role in the
recovery of employment 5. The re-appraisal showed that, despite the decline in share, they maintained an
important niche presence even in advanced technology sectors, and made major contributions to
2  See Kristin  Hallberg  "A market  oriented  strategy  for small  and medium  scale  enterprises"  IFC Discussion  Paper
no 40. (Table  1).
3  This  is discussed  in "Post-privatization  assistance;  when  is it justified  and  how can the World  Bank  help?"  Syed
Mahmood;  ECSPF  Occasional  Paper  No. 2, 1998.
4  The  disadvantages  faced  by SMEs  may  be characterized  as direct  costs  and  compliance  costs.  Of the latter,
Government  planning  regulations  and tax administration  are the most  frequently  cited burden.  See e.g.  Graham
Bannock  and  Alan Peacock  "Governments  and  Small  Business"  chapter  10.  Chapman  1989.
5  The  extent  of the overall  employment  effect  counting  both  births  and deaths  of small  enterprises  has  however
been  debated  e.g. see D. Snodgrass  and  T. Biggs  "Industrialization  and  the small  firm; patterns  and  policies"
International  Center  for Economic  Growth  1996.2
innovation 6. In some OECD economies, SMEs (under 100 employees) still accounted for 95% of
establishments and their share of employment,  though considerably smaller, was in fact quite stable at
around 30%. They were increasingly viewed as critical to the health of the enterprise sector as well as
justifying relatively intensive support measures.
1.5  A parallel reappraisal of enterprise policy occurred in the developing world where, given the
prevailing relative factor prices and labor-intensive product mix, the role of SMEs was likely to be even
more significant and where the contribution of SMEs to GDP was in any case significantly larger (outside
the ex- centrally planned economies). Typically firms with less than 100 employees accounted for 99% of
total enterprises and well over 50% of total employment in the sector. The reappraisal in policy was
reflected in intensified policy research such as through the ILO World Employment Program 7. It was
shown that in some industries economies of scale were achievable only when other complementary inputs
were present at adequate scale and quality-  notably capital-intensive transport, energy and technical
support services, i.e. that scale economies were factor-price specific and might not apply. In economies
that lacked infrastructure, and where relative wages and land rents were low, small to medium scale
operation could be relatively efficient. As a result of such findings small and medium enterprise support
schemes in developing economies proliferated since the 1970s.
Enterprise Decline - the transitional economies
1.6  The problems facing enterprise in the transitional economies are particularly acute. The serious
output declines and decapitalization of the past few years, resulting from the collapse of the large scale
state enterprises and the lack of a basis of small (e.g. service) enterprises, have made it particularly urgent
to find ways to foster the growth
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6  Eg in the UK this was  a finding  of the 1971  Bolton  Committee  Of  Inquiry  on Small  Firms.
7  E.g.  as represented  by "Technology  and  Employment  in Industry"  Ajit S. Bhalla  ed, ILO 1975.
8  Scale  definitions;  micro-enterprises  are very  small  businesses  either  in rural  or urban areas  including  artisans,
craftsmen,  processing  units and  service  suppliers  employing  less  than 10  workers.  Small  and  medium  scale
enterprises  are in general  manufacturing,  processing  and service  enterprises  in urban  or semi  urban areas
employing  from 10 up to about 100  workers,  and  in some case  up to 500.  These  definitions  are indicative  only,
and vary  according  to the level of development,  the size of an economy,  and  other  factors.3
large to smaller scale enterprises, with small enterprise shares rising steadily to over 50% of employment
since 1992 in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Lithuania, whereas in the late-recovery
CIS economies (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan) recorded small enterprise shares of sector employment
remain below 25%.
1.7  While the relative efficiency of small scale versus large scale production is not clear in all
conditions 9, it is however likely that in appropriate factor price/ endowment conditions small scale
production can be economic in many product areas, and in some sub-sectors small firms have been the
most innovative, and dynamic. But leaving aside the efficiency arguments the existence of large
proportions of the labor force in this sector in market economies means that the sector's development has
to be a central focus of economic policy for the transition economies and the current relative stagnation is
a major problem.
II. ALTERNATIVE  ENTERPRISE SUPPORT MECHANISMS AND THEIR
DEVELOPMENTAL  RATIONALE
Evolution of Support Instruments
2.1  SME assistance has been at three main levels - the macroeconomic, the 'meso-economic' (market
institutional, regulatory), and the micro (firm) level. As stated at the start of this paper, our concem is
with trying to identify cost-effective interventions at the level of inputs to firms.
2.2  Development policy in general until the 1970s tended to assume that Governments generally
acted in the public interest, to enhance welfare through eliminating market failures and through
redistribution of resources. Accordingly, the design of technical support for enterprise in general and
SMEs in particular, in the Bank and outside, tended to be located centrally within the Government
bureaucracy. Increasingly however, it was found that Government failure may be as or more important
than market failure. For example, whether in the area of exports assistance through official trade
promotion agencies, or in the area of small business support through centralized Government  enterprise
departments,  the experience of support to business was unsatisfactory 10  In the case of enterprise export
support, the use of public sector service suppliers is considered to have failed" in all but a few cases (e.g.
in East Asia'2). Even given an appropriate policy environment, experience suggests that State institutions
are only likely to be effective as long as they enjoy the support and participation of the business
community, are well funded, have staff experienced in relevant technical areas, and have a significant
degree of autonomy from bureaucracy and political interference. These conditions have generally not
been met. 13  The conclusions of one Bank study of the issues were that interventions should (a) support,
9  See Kristin  Hallberg  IFC Discussion  Paper  No 40, 1999;  op cit.
'°  e.g. see "World  Bank Lending  for Small  Enterprises  1989-93"  L. Webster,  R. Riopelle,  and  A. Chidzero  World
Bank  Technical  Paper  no. 311(1996).
l  l  Keesing  and Singer  for example  reviewed  27 Bank enterprise  development  and export  support  projects  approved
between  1980  and 1990.  With  few  exceptions  (eg the Philippines  Design  Center)  they  found  that  staff
themselves  considered  the results  unsatisfactory  both  in terms of export  achievement  and institution  building.
See  "Expanding  manufactured  exports  through  support  services"  Don  B. Keesing  and  Andrew  Singer,  World
Bank 1990.
12  E.g.  in Hong  Kong,  Taiwan  and Singapore.  However  in these  cases State  agencies  were also  helped  by
exceptionally  strong  export  environments  and a dynamnic  private  sector,  and attributability  of State  support  is
difficult  to assess.
1  Keesing  and Singer  strongly  advocated  a change  in approach.  See  e.g. "Development  assistance  gone wrong.
failures  in services  to promote  and support  manufactured  Exports"  World  Bank, 1990.4
Box  I  Traditional  Export  lriootion  iii Knya  not replace, the marketplace, and (b) have a
'light touch', through decentralization of
The  need  for  a supportive  economic  policy  regime d  the  services.  The box refers to similar
ineffectiveness  of state  promorion  was  highlightcd  in  the SAR  conclusions from Kenya.
for  the Kenya  Export  Developmnt  Prcct  (1991):i:  "despite
extensive  help  by extemal  donors  the Ministry'  activities  are a  2.3  To try to find ways of assisting more
textbook  study  in the ineffectiveness  of official  trade
promotion  agencies.  Without  generl poicies tiat support  effectively the Bank has tried new approaches
exports,  exporter  assis  programs  ... have r0v  to supporting enterprises, and exporters,
premature  and  ineffective....,  the  Ministry's  staffing,  small  avoiding State promotional organizations.
budget,  and  lack  of accountability  to the private  sector  render  One way has been to establish autonomous
it unsuitale  to provide  the broad  range  of services  required  by  semi-public business support institutions,
Kenyan  cxvorters.~'6 which provide assistance in a more market-
sensitive way. These interventions
nevertheless remain essentially supply-side. Another approach has been to try to directly expand the
market for business development services, by providing incentives to purchasers of services. The
resulting increase in demand in turn stimulates service provision from existing and new independent
private service suppliers. Another version of the demand-driven, decentralized approach to enterprise
support, but more experimental, has been based on vouchers, mainly in micro-enterprise support and
training.
Public Goods, subsidies and Enterprise Support
2.4To justify public interveation in general it has to be shown that the public sector is (i) resolving a clear
market failure (greater than any distortion the intervention itself might create) and (ii) intervening in a
cost-effective way. It is not enough simply to show that a public intervention successfully  produces an
output. (Equally it is not enough to evaluate projects on the basis of whether they simply meet output
objectives). The intervention has to produce an efficient net benefit additional to what private initiative
left on its own would have been willing to produce - i.e. a positive externality. It has to produce a public
good, to 'make the market'."
14  Brian  Levy  et al. "Technical  and  Marketing  Support  Systems  for Successful  Small  and  Medium  Size Enterprises
in Four  Countries"  World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  #1400.  Dec 1994.
5  A market  failure  occurs  when  an externality  exists.  A private  activity  that would  be economically  and socially
beneficial  is discouraged  because  the perceived  costs  to  the private  activity  are higher  than its cost to society,
and/or  because  the expected  value  of the benefits  accruing  to the private  activity  are lower  than the benefits  to
society.5
Box  2 The  Market  Failure/  Public  Goods  Rationale  for  Assistance  with  Business  Development  Services
The  economic  justification  for-public  intervention  to increase  the  supply  and demand  for  business  services
depends  on the existence  of failures  in the private  market,  For  example:
Damand  side  faues  may  result  from  lack  of knowledge  by frm  of what  is available  in terms  of business
services.,  and  how  they  can  be of use. Such  lack  of knowledge  is often  caused  by market  segmentation  with
information  only  flowing  to certain  firms  (usually  larger  export/import  firms).  Information  on  export  potential  is
particularly  lacking  for  SMEs.  There  is also  a problem  of 'short  term-ism'  (excessively  high  discounts  on  the value
over  time  of outside  advice  due  to perceived  risk/uncertainty);  low  valuations  of outside  advice  mean  that  access  costs
of services  are likely  to be seen  as too high.  In  some  poorer  economy  situations  private  valuation  oftraining  is reduced
because  of lack  of certainty  about  its benefits,  so that  its costs  appear  excessively  high  in reaton to its bernefits.'
Putting  a value  on training  is particularly  difficult  because  it is an 'experience  good'.  The  benefit  received  is difficult
to value  prior  to  completion  of the training,  at which  point  the incenive  to pay  is reduced.
Supply  sidefaius  are linked  to the demnd side-a  undeeveloped maket results  in low  expted  returns
to business  servce  provision.  First  mover  trmsaction  oosts  nay  also  be  reatively  high.  Market  segmentation  can  be
another  problem-if services  are  tied  traditionally  to ceain sectors  and  there  is a lack  of knowledge  about  other
sectors.  Preemptive  foreign  competition  (external  trade,  accounting  and  auditng  services)  may put  up barriers  to local
entrants,  or,  on  the other  hand,  protective  policies  may  reduce  the demonstration  effects  of foreign  competition.  There
nmay  also  be a lack  of!  inappropriate  professional  training rinfstructure  to produce  advisors- or a relatively  bigh
threshold  investment  in such  training.
Lined market  faires  mnay  occur  in, for  example,  the  financial  sector-SMEs  are seen  as risky  borrowers  due
partly  to lack  of a track  record  and  bank  knowledge  and  lack  of access  to finance  could  reduce  activity  and  demand  for
business  services  .In the  case  of exporting  finms,  lack  of pre-shipment  and  post  shipment  finance  effecively
constrains  orduction and  indireclv  reduces  demand  for  business  services.
2.5  Development assistance generally involves by definition some form of subsidy. In the case of
technical assistance, whether local or foreign, the existence of a market failure may justify a subsidy if,
for example, it can accelerate early stage market development. But the level of the subsidy has to be in
some sense proportional to the market failure being addressed. Larger subsidies may be justified by larger
failures. The greater the financial cost-revenue deficit, the larger must be the public goods (externality)
element in order to justify covering the deficit from public funds. In general, in terms of economic
efficiency and growth, subsidies should be (a) small enough to just offset the distortion or market failure
(which implies being well targeted); (b) they should achieve their objective within a limited time
(otherwise the targeting may break down); (c) they should be transparent (to minimize abuse, and to allow
their impact to be easily monitored); (d) they should not have significant macro/fiscal effects (which may
complicate the incidence of the subsidy and the incentives arising from it); and (e) they should be feasible
without excessive administrative cost.
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2.6  Earlier schemes for centralized provision of business development services were relatively
insensitive to demand and also tended to create a monopolistic service supplier that could undercut the
development of competitive private suppliers, and might over-invest in services not necessarily in demand
nor of high quality. Such approaches did not adhere to the rule of minimizing the distortion created by
16  The Bank's  OP 8.30  (para  8) states  that subsidies  should  be (a) transparent,  targeted  and  capped  (b) funded
through  Government  budget  or other  sources  subject  to regular  control  and review,  (c) fiscally  sustainable,  (d)
they should  not do not give an unfair  advantage  to some  FIs over  other  qualified  and directly  competing
institutions,  and (e) they  should  be economically  justified,  or the least  cost  way of achieving  poverty  reduction.
'7  See "The  Banks  Approach  to Subsidies"  CPD Discussion  Paper  no 1986-44.  Robert  Myers  et al. Subsidies  can
improve  efficiency  in  two ways:  first  best,  where  they adjust  prices  directly  to capture  externalities  or smooth
price shocks;  second  best where  they  offset  price  distortions  created  by Govermnent  policies  which  cannot  be
removed  in the short  term.  Firm level interventions  are mainly  of the second  type.6
intervention itself, and they  Bx  3 Tanzania  - State  SptBypassed  Existing  Local  Capacity.
were neither temporary nor
transparent. Even if they  Despite  dth  hostile  environment  for  private  enterprise  in the 1970s,  the
managed to effect an increase  commercial  distrit of Dar  Es Salaam  still hosted  many  small  private
in services leading to an  business  service  providers  - bookkeepers  and accountants,  forwarding  and
increase in output, this was not  courier  agencies,  marketin agents,  and  business  training  establishments.
by itself an adequate  These  small  busiesses seemed  to be invisible  both  to the donor  agencies
justification for public technical  and to  the Goverment, both  of whom  preferred  instead  to set up high  profile
assistance  intervention, and  MIcra  promotion  facilities.  Yet  these  nicro-firms  were operating  as assis ance tu ervento n, and  profitalel commercial  businesses;  they understood  the market  and the
could actually be harmful if it  business  enviromen To t  outside  observer  it seemed  that  the small
did not lead to sustainable  accoutants offces, for example,  stimulated  by increased  demand  and with
development of the market. An  some  technical  help,  could  be the sedrn  of future  accountay,  business
illustration of this is from  aice  and consultant  service  firms.  But instead  they  had to compete  with
Tanzania (see box).  dnor-financed  facilities  working  out of expensively  staffed  and equipped
offices,  and providing  free  services.  Fortunately  for them,  the local
2.7  To address the  knowledge  and the marekting  e  of these  state-sponsored  bureaux was
problem, a  more recent  weak,  so  thit  the  lcal service  supls  were  not seriously  damaged  and
approach to enterprise support  ithe  lay  retained  theirt  iinvisible'  customers.  However,  it was
has been to establish semi-  an opptywastedbcause  it was  these  existin fledging service  firms public~~ ~  auoomu  agen  ies  heslves  Sthatwould  hve benefited  from  advice,  training,  and  incentives public autonomous  agencies. 
Such  aproachs  may e more  to upgrade  to contriue  to entrprise growth  and  improved  governance. Such approaches may be more  I
market-sensitive; services may
be provided with some degree of cost recovery, and the agency may assist to some extent capacity
building in service provision (e.g. outsourcing to local consultant firms) as well as itself providing
services to specific enterprises. However, these schemes are normally designed still to inject into the
market a donor-driven central provider; the central provider may have a mandate to upgrade local
capacity, but as a general rule such schemes do not address demand and market creation directly.
Moving from Supply side Subsidies to demand side graBts
2.8  The market for business development services may be divided into strategic and operational
services  9.  Operational services are routine activities such as freight and mail forwarding, printing and
publishing, and bookkeeping. The market does not generally fail for routine services. The failure is more
likely with strategic services which are outside the regular experience of small firms - such as diagnostic
analysis, financing, reorganization, specialized market planning (e.g. exports), identification of
investment partners etc. It is in these areas that a subsidy may be justified.
2.9  If a subsidy is needed and justified then a more effective way to provide it than implicitly through
a service-supply institution may be to target the subsidy in the form of an explicit grant for the purchase
of specific services - i.e. addressing the pa~rticular  demand side failure 20. A subsidy to the demand side
could still be distorting if it failed to stimulate appropriate sustainable development of the market, but it is
Some  alternative  types  of essentially  supply-side  instruments  are summarized  in Syed Mahmood;  op cit.  Recent
examples  in transitional  economies  are the Lithuania  Enterprise  and  Financial  Sector  Assistance  Project,  and  the
Moldova  Private  Sector  Development  Project.
9  It may  also  be divided  up into several  categories  of service,  each of which  might  face different  market
conditions,  but we are simply  outlining  the overall  principle  here.
20  It should  be pointed  out that  who  gets  the subsidy  depends  on market  conditions.  Subsidies  to purchasers  are to
some degree  'passed  on' to suppliers,  and vice  versa,  depending  on elasticities  of demand  and  supply.  But who  is
the initial  recipient  may  be important  for incentive  reasons.7
more likely to stimulate a sustainable expansion than the imposition of a subsidized supplier on to an
infant services industry.
2.10  A subsidy to transactions (demand or supply) is less efficient in static terms than a non-
transactional subsidy (e.g. a subsidy for public information or general technical upgrading) because it
directly affects (distorts) selling and buying decisions. However, market creation is not a static but a
dynamic process in which incentives and sequencing mat be as important as resource allocation, and a
market transaction carries an inherent learning-by-doing benefit different from that of pure information
provision 'offline'.  This is because the learning process may be delivered more effectively. If this is so,
then giving incentives to directly boost demand and accelerate transactions may produce as great or
greater benefits than non-transactional subsidies.
2.11  Figure 2 depicts the market creation process. Initially the market at A is small and insensitive to
the cost of services. A subsidy to demand for services (say through a grant) results in an upward shift in
demand from DI to D2. Service supply responds by initially expanding to point B (at a higher supply
price). But if the grant both increases demand and reduces supplier's risk, thereby changing the supply
conditions and encouraging new entrants, then the supply also shifts upwards, to S2, and the market to
point C, at an average price equal to or below the starting level. The supply may also become more
competitive, shown by increased elasticity, reflecting a more active and liquid market.
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2.12  A fairly rapid change in conditions of supply (e.g. through better information and reduced
supplier's risk) is key to the development of the market. If a supply shift is not achieved and the supply
curve remains at about S 1 (and the market at point B) then most of the subsidy would be captured by
service suppliers in higher profits, with little expansion of the market. The more the service supply shifts
outwards, the greater the benefit will be for the users of services and greater the increase in market
activity. A favorable shift in user-firm perception must also take place (e.g. through greater certainty
about the value of services), such that demand remains elevated above Dl  even after the subsidy (and its
incentives) has been removed. (If demand remains at D2 this would suggest that the subsidy exactly
eliminated a market failure). Otherwise, the market would contract back towards D, and then to A as8
suppliers exit, and the whole exercise would have been a costly waste of resources. To help lock in the
essential changes in market perception the subsidy should be phased out over time.
2.13  In contrast to the market-expansion scenario, the 'traditional' public sector enterprise service
provider approach could conceivably result in a reduction in domestic service supply (because the
subsidized supply of services reduces the average price obtainable for services), or a contractionary shift
in supply (e.g. if existing service firms perceive that they can no longer compete and they have to exit the
market ). Its effect on demand is difficult to predict (it could reduce demand for existing services or it
might over time have a leaming/demonstration effect from increased knowledge of available services). 21
2.14  Among the partial approaches to market development is one which fosters competitive supply.
This occurred for example with business training services (used e.g. in  Chile). The approach was to allow
private service provision but to select providers centrally through a (donor or State-sponsored)
competition process (an approach which retains a degree of central control of the supply side). This is
partial because it supports competitive supply and price but it does not directly solve the problem of
relevance and quality vis-a-vis client demand. The same procedure is used by one of the leading
consulting agencies in this field. 22
2.15  One method of targeting demand, through a partial subsidy, has been through a Matching Grant
Fund (MGF) instrument, which has been used by the Bank increasingly (though still infrequently) for
delivering consulting and training assistance to business enterprises, as well as inputs into other sectors
such as education and social services. The MGF has up to now been used mainly to boost demand but it
could be also used to expand and upgrade service providers to meet more sophisticated demand by user
firms.  It could fund both non-transactional and transactional services ranging from simply free
information provision to financing the purchase of a business service.
2.16  Another demand-side approach is to use vouchers. Vouchers are a partial transactional subsidy
like a matching grant, but they provide a currency of payment for services. 23 This feature can further
reduce the risk of the transaction to both service supplier and user.  Some voucher projects have had good
results. For example the evaluation of a Paraguay training voucher project claimed that "instead of the
empty classrooms and lack of enthusiasm for the supply side approach even with private  providers,
demand  for training services  picked  up strongly."
2.17  Figure 3 depicts a continuum of assistance approaches, from the traditional centralized supply
side method to the most decentralized demand-driven  method. In practice there are many variations on
these models and there is no case for saying that one approach is necessarily superior to another; specific
conditions are critical. For example some facilities are not intended to be part of a local service market,
but are temporary donor agency outreach  oT coordination offices, supplying specific services to support
donor projects. But theory and experience suggest that a demand-driven approach if it can be adequately
managed, will give superior capacity building results and a stronger development impact.
21  These  issues  are also  explored  in 'East Africa  - Non-Policy  Instruments  for Private  Sector  development'  World
Bank 1994
22  SwissContact  have designed  many projects  around  the idea  of local firms  bidding  to become  preferred  providers.
23  It should be noted that the value of the voucher 'grant'  still depends on the ability of service supply capacity to
shift. If supply is inelastic then the increased demand would simply cause prices to rise.9
Figure 3.  A continuum of Enterprise Assistance Models
Supply Driven  - *  Demand Driven
State Development  Autonomous  Assistance  Fund  Assistance  Fund  Voucher  progm
Promotion  Agency  Public  agency  Public  agency  Pvt/Contract  rnngmt  Pvt/Contrct nngmt
Government  Mngrnt  Private/Contract  Mgt  Govt control  Decentralized  Decentratized
Centralized  Part decentralized  Part decntralized  Private SPs  CO-paynmt
Govcrnment  SP  a/  Private/public  SPs  Private  SPs  Co-payment  Private  (?local)  SPs
Full  subsidy  Some  service  fees  Co-payment  (Smaul/micro  ents)
a/  SP = service provider
Who gets the grants?
2.18  In trying to maximize social benefits all grant programs face a rationing problem. That is, if
services are supplied at below free market price then there is by definition 'excess'  demand, which leads
to queuing, and thus the potential for arbitrary/corrupt behavior on the part of those in control of the
funds. This problem has to be guarded against by designing a market-like rationing method. In practice
Matching Grant projects have used simple objective eligibility criteria, and firm self-selection through
FIFO and partial co-payments. Those eligible firms that are first in the queue are not necessarily the most
efficient firms, but selecting the fastest respondents may have momentum benefits, which might be called
X-efficiency effects. If the primary objective is institution building (e.g. making a market for business
services) and if this is most likely with rapid momentum, then rapid disbursement of funding (FIFO) with
low selection discretionality might be X-efficient. Nevertheless, the use of grants should best involve
criteria which approximate to efficient selection.
Should there be subsidies for equipment purchase?
2.19  To assist small firms to invest there may be a case for subsidizing the cost of equipment. (This
has been done in some micro-enterprise projects). However the case is not strong. A market failure in
financing of fixed assets is less likely than for financing of know-how. Know-how benefits are more
diffusable than is the case with equipment, yielding a benefit potentially considerably higher than the
market cost 24. For example know-how embodied in workers can move between jobs, or to people outside
the workforce, while equipment tends to remain proprietary and inaccessible to other firms. Thus for
equipment the benefits are generally fully captured by the purchasing enterprise whereas for knowledge
acquisition they may not be. There may also be a market failure in access to finance which penalizes
know-how purchasers. For equipment loans banks have norms for asset valuation and loan security (e.g.
collateral), which reduce the uncertainty of lending. For investment in knowledge such norms may not
exist.
2.20  The case for equipment subsidies is stronger in some special cases. For example, with collective
investments there may be external knowhow benefits. This might for example apply to a design center or
a common repair facility. Collective investment arrangements have been promoted for this reason by
business associations in countries such as Italy and Germany, or public-private assistance centers (Japan,
Denmark, Korea). In South Africa business partnerships were encouraged to prepare joint programs for
outside assistance 25. Nevertheless, a collective investment that captures these external benefits is more
24  A prime example of positive knowledge diffusion externalities is the mass  acquisition of internet capability
throughout  the population  which  may  be considered  to produce  social  benefits  far greater  than  the financial  costs
(e.g.  salaries  of IT workers)  or the price  of software  and  IT products.
25  See "South  Africa; Industrial Competitiveness and Job Creation Project" World Bank Appraisal Report 1997.10
likely to access adequate private loan finance. A more important exception to the rule is perhaps where a
fixed investment generates clear extemalities such as environmental improvement (e.g. pollution control).
Reducing Investment Cost by Unbundling Equipment Loans
2.21  Pressure to help firms by subsidizing investment has resulted from the very high real interest rates
(between 20% and 50%) that have prevailed in some transitional economies countries (e.g. Armenia,
Georgia, Kyrgyz, Russia, and Ukraine and Moldova) due to macroeconomic adjustment difficulties. A
way of addressing this need may be to unbundle loans into know-how finance and fixed investment
finance, using grant finance for know-how in parallel with credits for fixed investment. Most ICRs and
PARs for the Bank's matching grant projects have cited as a main lesson the need to coordinate enterprise
grants and credits in the form of an assistance package that could address both the hardware and the
software needs of firms.
2.22  Unbundling of finance according to the public goods characteristics of the assets financed would
not compromise the financial system since the bank loans would continue to be made for bankable
investments at market rates while the grants would be from parallel windows financed outside the
banking system. Nevertheless, the grant windows should conform to norms (limited fiscal effects,
transparency, temporary and should not pervert incentives to borrow). Grants should not be for
knowledge assets which are integral and proprietary to the equipment, should not distort
lending/borrowing  behavior by being made contingent on loans e.g. 'teaser grants' purely to attract
business, and, finally should not be used to reduce general lending risk by leveraging the free funds.
Initial Country Conditions and Environment
2.23  The generation of externalities (e.g. through accelerating market development) may require
particular economic conditions. In the case of enterprise technical assistance these conditions must be
ones that promote the dissemination of know-how beyond the confines of the immediate recipient
enterprise. A principal condition is adequate capacity and motivation of the productive sector to absorb
innovative know-how. An economy which is in restructuring and recovery mode, but which possesses
existing (if obsolescent) underutilized technical skills in the enterprise sector, may be more likely to reap
long termn  benefits from a short term resource injection into the market for technical services than an
economy that is trying to overcome long term structural constraints on the development of the technical
services industry. An environment (e.g. a transitional economy) in which existing skills are being wasted
may also generate stronger incentives to make the market work than an environment in which skills are
being developed ab initio. The public goods case for intervention in the technical services market may
therefore be clearer in transitional economies.
III.  EXPERIENCE WITH VOUCHER PROGRAMS
Characteristics Of Voucher Schemes
3.1  To develop the market for business services by addressing demand, training and technical
assistance voucher schemes have been tried in several countries26,  usually as part of wider projects.
26  See "voucher  programs;  potential,  problems  and  prospects"  Gabriel  Schor  and  Lara Goldmark,  IDB March  1999
(paper for Rio conference). The IADB is financing eight voucher programs in Latin America.I1
Vouchers are subsidies to transactions that are expected to promote demand by lowering service cost in
relation to its expected value, and by providing liquidity direct to the user. They promote service supply
since the currency (redeemable vouchers) used for payment in advance eliminates a part of the supplier's
payment risk (compared with ex post reimbursement) while the fact that the vouchers have to be endorsed
by the user on completion of training reduces the purchaser's risk. Voucher schemes require close
management because of  their relative administrative complexity and because vouchers are convertible to
cash, resulting in greater exposure to possible collusion and fraud which could be counter-productive for
the sustainable development of the services market
3.2  One of the first pilots was an IDB project initiated in 1995 in Paraguay 27,  Service providers were
screened and registered, with the register remaining continuously open during the project life to promote
new entries and competition. Vouchers had a fixed monetary amount that was set to partially cover the
cost of the training courses. The voucher received from the trainee was exchangeable by the service
provider for cash only on the trainee's completion of the course. Prevention of fraud was handled through
screening of training providers and clients, personalization of vouchers, attendance records and site visits,
and potential disqualification of providers. Initial assessments in 1999 show that after a learning period
there was strong growth in voucher use and in the number of service providers. In some cases enterprise
directors themselves started training programs for other enterprises. The diversity and convenience of
training provision also improved. However, problems lay in the administration of the schemes.
3.3  A scheme in Peru was less successful. This was because vouchers were distributed to a limited
number of donor clients, and their face value was set as a percentage of total cost so that larger enterprises
tended to receive larger grants, building in a bias against smaller firms. Fraud was not adequately
controlled (especially collusion between trainers and clients ) and a secondary market grew up which
distorted the planned pattern of voucher usage. The percentage valuation of voucher may also have led,
via collusion, to increases in training course fees. Technical assistance services proved difficult to
standardize and control for quality and fraud. The project demonstrated the major importance of publicity
and control, and a credible, autonomous managing institution. In other projects low uptake of vouchers
has been a problem suggesting the need to carefully identify the target market, set the value of vouchers
to provide an adequate incentive to user firms in relation to average service expenditures, simplify
voucher acquisition and redemption, and ensure wide publicity, .
Voucher Initiatives in the Bank
3.4  The Bank initiated a voucher project in Kenya in1994, 29 under a scheme known as the Jua Kali
(hot sun) program. Tracer studies prior to completion showed that assets, sales, product range and
employment were all significantly greater in the grant recipient firms than a control group. 30 Early
indications show mobilization of the apprenticeship market and training by entrepreneurs of other
entrepreneurs. The mobilization of this previously 'invisible' source of enterprise technical support is key
to successful local market development as it provides domestic learning and empowerment.
Complications of voucher allocation and collusion are being addressed. The use of Jua Kali associations
themselves to allocate vouchers has mobilized additional 'invisible'  capacity as the JKAs become
participants and not simply beneficiaries in the project. This may be regarded as a critical element of
27  See  "Paraguayan  vouchers  revisited:  strategies  for the Development  of Training  Markets"  Caren.  Botelho  and
Lara  Goldmark  DAI/  USAID.  Hanoi  conference  paper,  April  2000.
28  "Developing  Performance  Indicators  for Voucher  Programs:  The Cordoban  Experience,  Caren  Addis  and  Linda
Fitzgerald."  Draft,  August  2000.
29  Kenya-Micro and Small  Enterprise  Project 1994.
30  "Kenya-micro and small  enterprise  development  project-tracer study  for  phase  one" Netcom  Jan 1999.12
successful decentralization and demand-orientation. The overall cost-benefit performance of the project
has yet to be assessed.
3.5  As in other interventions an important issue is the need to identify what if any market failures
actually apply, the implicit assumption being an information failure in the market for business services. If
this is correct then provision of information should result in an upsurge in sustainable services which will
continue after the project ends, rather than finishing when the temporary injection of voucher-based
liquidity ends.
3.6  Voucher schemes have to overcome relatively complex design issues and management
requirements and they incur high operation costs to provide successful coordination, guard against fraud,
and ensure high quality service provision. The Bank has not implemented enough of these projects to
draw firm lessons, and none have yet been completed. Careful evaluations should be made of the initial
projects while new projects are under preparation, including an urban micro-business project in Mexico
and a proposed Rural Investment Fund in Zambia, which is expected to include agricultural input and
technology dissemination vouchers.
IV.  IMPLEMENTING  MATCHING GRANT FUNDS
Experience with MGFs
4.1  Matching grant funds (MGFs) have been increasingly used to finance know-how services and
training in the enterprise sector (see figure 4). MGFs promote demand by lowering the cost of business
services compared to the user's (risk-adjusted) valuation of the service, and increased demand in turn
induces expanded supply. They may be less effective than vouchers in reducing the service provider's risk
but the MGFs are administratively simpler than voucher schemes while probably promoting more quality
control over the supply of services as part of a sustainable market for business services.
4.2  One of the first MGFs was set
Figure 4  MGF Project Approvals by Region  up in 1961by the Irish Export Board as
and Time Period  a marketing development fund. Grant
funds have also been set up for
business advisory services in Europe,
including the UK, France, Italy, and
8  - X  _ _____  -[  U  E  LCR  Norway. A scheme set up by the
7  _-  _  _  _A*  EA  British DTI in 1988 was designed to
61-  __  encourage firms of less than 400
5  - _  __  employees to use management
1 4  - - Af  rica  consultants. A review of that project in
3  - 1991 showed that 21,000 programs had
2  - E Asia  been started for firms, 90% of
1  - _  SC --  Gl  S Asia  beneficiaries stated that they had
0 - _  _  7  _  ,  received value for money, and 74% of
1986690  1991-95  1996-2000  beneficiaries planned to use consultants
again paying full market price.3
31  Cited  in  the SAR for "Mauritius-Technical  Assistance  to Enhance  Competitiveness"  Page 15.13
4.3  Since 1986, about 16 Bank MGF projects for business development and/or export support have
been completed or are ongoing (one cancelled) (as shown in the annex). The total value of these funds is
US$216.5 million or on average US$ 13.5 million per fund. and approximately 6,000 subprojects have
been implemented so far. The rate of implementation has accelerated along with geographical
diversification.
4.4  The earliest significant Bank scheme was the 1986 India Engineering Export Development
Project, which contained a consultant fund and a productivity fund, each of $10 million. Both were
managed by  State banks (ICICI and Eximbank). They required 50% matching funds and single firms or
groups of firms could receive up to $200,000 in subsidy. The managing banks kept staff to a minimum
and used decentralized, streamlined approval procedures. The project was rated a success, though there
were implementation delays and not all (80%) of the funds were disbursed. Estimated export growth rates
of beneficiaries following the grants far exceeded the national average. This was the model for a follow-
up project in India in 1989, with four funds totaling $20 million and maximum grants of $500,000 per
firm. This project was also rated a success with significant incremental export achievement. A significant
feature of the Indian project was the use of banks as administrators of the funds; this facilitated parallel
loan activity to finance fixed assets and working capital alongside the grant financing of advisory
services.
4.5  A similar  project, for export development and small medium enterprise assistance, was started in
Indonesia in 1986, although in this case the managing agency was a State-sponsored entity-the  Export
Support Board. Total funds were $8 million supporting exports through marketing, production
management, training, technical assistance and including small equipment purchases. The co-payment
percentages were 50% or above. Grants for advisory services were linked to a credit line and maximum
grant amounts were relatively small at $10,000 per assignment. Processing delays caused slow
disbursement (68% at closure) but the advisory services were considered successful and exports increased
by a large multiple of the grant amount. Nevertheless firms were not prepared to pay full price for the
services after project completion, which suggests that the market creation impact may have been limited.
4.6  Among the principal lessons of implementation from these early schemes was the need for a
supportive enterprise policy regime (e.g. export policy), autonomous management unencumbered by
Government or political pressures and good intemal controls. Despite implementation problems the
evaluation of these schemes was positive and similar projects went ahead in Latin America from 1990,
and in Africa from 1991 starting in Kenya.
4.7  A recent study on MGFs in Chile and Mauritius 32 states: "the programs offer evidence that private
sector operations of BDS support programs with maximum autonomy and accountability of the
implementing agents offer significant benefits in cost effectiveness versus previous State executed
regimes. In addition to reduced cost, the private operators offer increased flexibility, improved
responsiveness and a more entrepreneurial attitude in meeting client needs than public sector providers."
The keys to success were arms-length management, low discretionality, and private sector service supply.
MGF Impact Assessment: the issue of additionality
4.8  The study of Mauritius and Chile also pointed out that it has been very difficult to assess the
impact of MGFs, partly as a result of lack of systematic data on the market development impact. The
question of impact is critical to the case for MGFs, as it is for all public interventions. Despite the
32  Dan Crisafulli  "Matching  Grant Schemes  for Enterprise  Upgrading:  A Comparative  Analysis"  Paper  presented  at
Rio De Janeiro Conference on Small Enterprises, March 1999.14
apparent improvement in design relative to traditional approaches, there remains the central concem about
whether MGFs are helping to create additionality, i.e. benefits beyond what the private sector would
otherwise be able to produce, in the form of economically efficient enterprises in a sustainable market for
services. If for example the constraint on enterprise demand for business services is simply lack of
finance, rather than high risk aversion due to lack of information, then market activity stimulated by a
temporary injection of liquidity will most likely fizzle out when the source of funding ends.
4.9  Another study of the Mauritius project 33 focused on enterprise efficiency. Additionality required
that enterprises were econonlically efficient, capable of creating spillover benefits, and able to absorb
assistance effectively. If the wrong enterprises were targeted then the rationale of the assistance
intervention was in doubt, so an appropriate enterprise appraisal procedure was needed. The ideal targets
were firmns  that did not show financial profits (so could not get market finance) but were economically
efficient and could achieve maximum benefits per assistance input. (The worst-case recipients were ones
that were both financially and economically unprofitable and needed subsidies just to stay afloat).
4.10  The contrary view 34 is that the momentum of activity itself is critical for the development of  the
market (reducing transaction costs for all players), and that a first-in-first-out approach to subprojects
with minimum transaction costs is essential to build the services market. Detailed appraisal procedures
introduce bureaucracy and discretionality. The strength of the Mauritius project was its flexibility,
simplicity in operation, management autonomy, and simple subproject selection.
4.11  Figure 5 is a stylized representation of the two views.
Figure 5  Two views of the design of matching grant funds
A. Enteprises  selected  B. Enterprises  selected
through appraisal  first-come-first-served
*  higher transaction  costs  *  lower transaction  costs
*  lower market momentun  *  higher market-momentum
*  higher subproject additionality  *  higher market additionality
*  more economically efficit  *  more x- efficient
4.12  On the one hand the appraisal approach may reap extemalities but it may be more discretionary,
bureaucratic and slow disbursing, thereby running the risk of failure to develop the momentum to create a
market. On the other hand the non-targeting approach avoids discretionary approvals, has higher rates of
disbursement -but is potentially less able to target the externalities. In reality these are not mutually
exclusive. Without creating a sustainable market the targeting approach cannot achieve additionality in
the longer run. Without creating additionality the non-targeting approach cannot maintain a sustainable
market in the long run.
4.13  In practice both approaches could also fail to meet their objectives if they are not designed and
managed properly. In the case of targeting there is risk that the wrong projects are selected, or that initial
33  See Tyler  Biggs  "a microeconometric  evaluation  of the Mauritius  Technology  Diffusion  Scheme"  World  Bank,
RPED  discussion  paper November  1999.
34  See  Dan Crisafulli:  op cit, and Andrew  Singer's  comments  on the Biggs  study  (Jan 2000).15
targeting is too inflexible. In the non-targeting case there have been many instances where fast
disbursement has not been achieved. Delays and interference, which are characteristic of schemes that
receive subsidies, could damage rather than develop a nascent market for business services. Optimal
design should aim to find a way of combining the best of both approaches, retaining the good access and
ease of disbursement but paying more attention to economics, possibly by including broad target groups
of firms and products and by pre-identifying clusters of promising enterprises.
V.  A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION  OF TEN MATCHING GRANT FUNDS
The Projects Selected
5.1  Ten projects were examined which had significant matching grant fund components for general
or export assistance. Six of the projects were selected because they have been completed and have ICRs
and/or PARs, and four are more recent projects in varying stages of work-in-progress. The inclusion of
more recent incomplete projects helps us to assess what changes in design have resulted from past
experience, although it is too soon to assess the impact of the evolved design.
5.2  The completed projects are from India (2), Indonesia, Argentine, Mauritius and Kenya. The two
projects in India were the pioneer funds, focussing on export services. Indonesia, Kenya and Argentine
also focussed on exports, while Mauritius was concerned with the broader provision of business services
to boost productivity. The other four projects selected are from Mexico, South Africa, Bangladesh and
Uganda, all of which have the broader business services focus. The Uganda project is nearing completion
and has been the subject of tracer studies.
Main MGF Project Design Features
5.3  The major features of the ten different MGF projects implemented by the Bank were as follows.
5.4  Generalprinciples. All ten projects subscribed to the principle of client-driven, decentralized
service provision, with a subsidy, via a matching grant, paying for services from private local, and
foreign, providers, with the central purpose of stimulating the market for expert services.
5.5  Uses of grants. All the projects offered grants for knowledge-based services, combined in two
cases with training. In the case of export development these included: marketing research and plans,
quality testing and certification, product adaptation, export fairs and national/international marketing
tours. In the case of business support they included business strategy and planning, production
management, product design, quality standards and control, productivity studies, information systems,
and training. Grants were not available for equipment and in some cases (e.g. South Africa) were
explicitly excluded.
5.6  Grant size andpayment  arrangements. The size of grant funds (the Bank's contribution) varied
widely, from US$2.0 million (Kenya) to US$30.0 million (Mexico),  approximately related to the size of
the respective enterprise sectors. Individual grants were subject to a maximum ranging from US$50,000
to US$200,000 and, exceptionally, above. The actual average grants paid varied from about US$8,000
(Kenya) to US$64,000 (Indonesia). Payment arrangements were 50% grant and 50% co-payment by the
recipient enterprises (except in Indonesia where it was 25% co-payment). Grants were all on a
reimbursement basis, subject to proof of eligible expenditure. (This latter arrangement is necessary for16
internal control purposes although it does create some uncertainty in the client firm, which may tend to
depress demand for grants).
5.7  Fund Governance. All projects had multi-tier governance with a Government agency or
autonomous Government entity (e.g. a Foundation) in overall control, usually complemented by a steering
committee or consultative council that approved larger grants. Where a non-Govemment institution was
in overall charge (e.g. Mexico and Uganda) there was an additional layer of administration which was
intended to act in place of the Government entity. The type of fund managing agency varied; in India the
fund was managed by State and private banks; in Mexico by the National Science Foundation through
multiple individual managing agents, and in Indonesia by a specially created Government office (the
Export Support Board). In other projects, management was provided by a single external specialist
consultant firm selected under international bidding rules. The autonomy of the managing agent, both
from political pressure and from ties to the service providers it was accrediting and paying, was thought to
be critical in achieving a streamlined and market-credible mechanism
5.8  Management Capacity building. The indigenisation of fund management varied. In the case of
India for example participating banks staffed special 'cells' to develop in-house expertise in export
advisory services. In other cases (e.g. Uganda) a foreign specialist management firm appointed a manager
and assistant manager plus local staff. The foreign consultant might act either as manager or as
management advisor. The local capacity building impact of the two approaches was different. In the first
case sustainable local capacity was put in place while, in the second case, the foreign management
approach did not aim to build fund management capacity, on the grounds that MGFs were supposed to be
temporary channels of support.
5.9  Service providers and quality controL The managing entities took responsibility for the quality
checking of service providers. The extent of supervision varied from on the one hand proactive assistance
for firms to develop proposals and select providers, to on the other hand more hands-off support such as
simply development of lists of registered providers or checks on providers selected independently by the
beneficiary firms.
5.10  Firm eligibility. All projects focused on individual or collective private sector SMEs, some
export oriented, some with broader business orientation. In a few cases (especially for exports) the funds
were also open to larger firms, and in one case (South Africa) micro-firms were included. Apart from the
first project in India (focused on engineering goods) there has been no product targeting, although the
actual sub-sectors supported were mainly in manufacturing, or (e.g. in South Africa) tradable services and
manufacturing.
5.11  Subproject eligibility. The eligibility of subprojects was in all cases based on the first-come-first-
served principle (FIFO) subject to set eligibility criteria, usually including provision of an agreed
marketing/business plan and, in the more recent projects, monitorable deliverables. In most cases
restrictions were put on the number of grants per firm over the life of the project. Beyond establishing
eligibility, past practice has been not to conduct more detailed appraisals, but the thinking on this is
shifting (see section 4).
5.12  Monitoring and evaluation. Earlier projects did not contain rigorous procedure but the later
projects incorporated explicit performance targets, deliverables targets, a double-funding safeguard, and a
monitoring agreement between the fund manager and the recipient firm to provide evaluation data.
5.13  Indicators of Output and Impact. This was addressed unevenly, because some projects were
implemented prior to the introduction of mandatory indicators, and also because impact, as opposed to
output, indicators, were not included except in very general terms (e.g. under development objectives).17
The most commonly used indicator was the number of subprojects completed and the sales or export
multiple (the ratio of sales/ export growth to grant value), and many projects were highly successful on
these criteria. These are unreliable measures for project impact as they do not measure efficiency or
additionality, nor market development performance.
Evaluation of The Six Completed MGF projects
5.14  Measurement issues The benefits of the projects are difficult to measure in the absence of
sensitive output, sustainability and impact indicators. This section makes an attempt  to draw some
conclusions from indicators of cost-effectiveness that were created ex post. 35
5.15  MGF operating costs. Measurement of fund operating is available for the completed projects,
with the exception of India where local banks took the management role and costs were not reported. The
MGF operating cost divided by value of grants disbursed gives an indicator of the efficiency with which
the MGF was implemented. This ranged from 18% (Argentine) to 57% (Kenya). The burden of this cost
is high compared with a typical fund management charges in other types of funds (e.g. in managed
venture capital funds the norm is about 3% of gross assets per annum). There are also overall governance
costs (e.g. project advisory committees and Government implementation units) that in principle should be
included.
5.16  Operating cost per grant approved ranged from US$1,326 per subproject (Kenya) to US$6,047
per subproject (Argentine 36). This was because Kenya gave a lot of small grants (average size US$2,320)
while Argentine gave few larger ones (average size US$16,792). Nevertheless, the Kenyan cost was a
much higher (and seemingly excessive) proportion of the value of each subproject. If governance costs
and Bank preparation and supervision costs are added to these figures there is certainly a presumption of
excessive overhead costs.
5.17  Momentum effect  - speed of Implementation. The speed of implementation is a rough indicator
of the momentum effect thought to be important to developing the services market. The disbursement lag,
where it can be isolated for the MGF alone, is a possible indicator of the momentum effect. The most
delayed disbursement over the project life was in the case of the Indian Engineering Export project, while
the most on-track performance was Kenya. In the case of the first India project, disbursements were
greatly delayed (and closing was put back by 2.5 years) as the participating banks took time to understand
the procedures of the MGF. The follow-up project in India was more successful in disbursing as the initial
participating banks had learned the procedures (although two new participating banks were somewhat
slower). In the case of Kenya, despite the good recorded disbursement performance, measured by the
small average disbursement lag, the ICR reported six-month average delays in the processing of
individual grants which soured relations with clients. Start-up delays were also reported for Indonesia; in
Argentine there were problems because of subproject cancellations, Government interference and weak
management follow-up. In Mauritius initial disbursement was reported as slow but then picked up. In
35  A relevant  part of the cost of a project,  not accounted  for by the Bank,  is the cost of Bank and  Government
preparation  and supervision  effort,  especially  in  relation  to loan  size.  Staff inputs  ranged  from 120  SW
(Argentina)  to 354  SW  (Indonesia).  However  it is not possible  to disaggregate  the MGF  component  from  the
remainder  of the project,  except  in Argentina  where the MGF  (US$32  million)  was  the principal  component.
Thus  in Argentina  120  SW  plus the real  cost  of Government  staff  would  amount  to over  US$  600,000  or over
2%  of project  cost.
However,  many  approved  subprojects  were  not completed  and some  were cancelled  because  of adverse  macro
economic  changes.18
Uganda a mid-term report suggested that implementation was slowing because of bureaucratization of
the process (lack of site visits).
5.18  Project Benefits. Project output was measured in terms of sales and/or export multiples. As
discussed, this is not necessarily a good measure mainly because it is not an efficiency or profitability
measure and because of attributability questions, but it can provide some indicative measure. The
achieved export and sales multiple was calculated for five projects and gave fairly uniform measures,
ranging between 37:1 and 50: 1, except in the case of Mauritius where a remarkably high ratio of 163:1 for
revenue and 124:1 for export sales was apparently achieved.  If these sales were (a) economically
profitable, and (b) largely attributable to the grant funding, then these indicators would suggest that the
MGFs performed very well. With regard to impact (both institutional impact and sustainability) no usable
quantified indicators were provided for the projects complete. A proxy indicator was speed of
disbursement, representing market stimulation. However, the Bank's ICRs and PARs made some non-
quantified assessments. The ICR/ PARs for the six completed projects rated outcomes as satisfactory in
five cases, and highly satisfactory in Mauritius; institutional development impact was rated partial or
modest in three cases, satisfactory in two cases, and highly satisfactory in Mauritius. Sustainability  was
rated weak in Kenya, likely in four cases, and highly likely in Mauritius.
5.19  Table 3A shows the evaluation for five of the ten projects, all of them completed and closed.
Table 3A  Cow parative Cost Effectiveness of MGF Proiects
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Ongoing MGF Projects
5.20  Table 3B shows a sixth completed project (Argentina) and the four ongoing projects. The
ongoing projects have moved away from export advisory services to general business support services,
which is characteristic of other more recent projects. Not much can be said prior to project completion
data. But one issue is that the designs are widely divergent; e.g. the expected management-intensity of
each project differs greatly. Planned operating costs as a percentage of the expected value of grants
ranged from only 6.2% in the case of South Africa, to nearly 50% in the case of Uganda. Since
management quality is so critical to the success of these projects, while at the same time the operating
cost of grant funds has to be kept in check, this suggests that good practice models for management and
governance of the MGFs have not been followed.
Table 3B  Comparative  Cost-effectiveness of MGF Proiects
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5.21  As stated in section 4, the benefits of the Mauritius project (table 3a) have been reevaluated  37;  the
efficiency of the enterprises selected was in doubt since only 10% of initial proposals were rejected and
because, to speed up disbursement, 80% of subprojects were approved after they were already under way.
3  Tyler Biggs; op cit20
One quarter of the grants were found to have gone to enterprises that did not produce additionality. While
the project may have deepened the market and reduced its riskiness, three quarters of the firms assisted
had previously used consultants and were not new to the market. While there were some new suppliers,
repeat business was low. Grants went almost entirely to users rather than service suppliers, and only a few
grants went to subprojects that generated increased demand for local consulting services. The evaluation
also found that nearly half of the firms assisted would have carried out their projects without the grant
funding. The net impact on smaller firrns  was better but still one quarter could have gone ahead without
the grants. If the reevaluation is correct then the market development impact was less than satisfactory.
MGF Project Evaluation summary
5.22  There was no clear indication that the different kinds of governance methods systematically
affected project performance. Rather performance was more a function of the quality of individual fund
management and its relationship with outside Government and non-Government bodies.
5.23  The measured output of the MGF projects was overall very satisfactory. But there are several
caveats which have been discussed - questions about additionality, and about attributability. With regard
to the latter, the relatively and absolutely high sales and export multiples may be inflated by various
factors -e.g. that the grant was only a small part of a wider enterprise investment program, that the
enterprises selected were already higher-than-average performers (selection bias), or that there was a
secular/cyclical upswing in output and exports affecting all enterprises.  38
5.24  The operating costs of the MGFs as a proportion of the total fund were high, and variable. This
raises a question about how far project design focused on cost-effectiveness, and how far good practice
norms are followed in designing the management structures.
5.25  The momentum effect of the projects, insofar as it can be determined by speed of disbursement,
was not good. In some cases major disbursement lags occurred, amounting to years. In no case was
disbursement as rapid as planned, even with the use of the first-in-first-out selection of projects. If the
market building case for MGFs rests on their momentum effects, then it is difficult to conclude from this
measure that the projects evaluated have met this goal.
5.26  The institution building and market development impact was not measured directly for these
projects. According to the Bank's own evaluations, based on qualitative judgements, the impact was
modest for five of the projects, and only one project, Mauritius, had high scores on these criteria. But the
reevaluation of the Mauritius project has shed some doubt on its market development impact as well.
5.27  From the mixed results found in this project evaluation and in other studies and reports for these
projects, it is clear that, if MGFs are to fulfil the market creation and institution building potential that we
have argued should be achievable, their design needs to be much more carefully worked out than it has
been up to now, and their implementation and management carried out under clearer and more
appropriate guidelines.
38  In the first India  project  export  gains  were impressive  but concentrated  in a few  firms  with  existing  strong
international  connections  (e.g.  Cumrnins,  Ingersoll-Rand)  which  raises  doubts  about  additionality.  A further
point  is that  exports  were maintained  in a time  of export  decline  - was  this therefore  assistance  to 'new
exporters'?  In Indonesia  the success  was  at a time  of major  export  expansion  - how  far did  the MGF  truly
contribute  to export  increase?.21
VI.  CONCLUSIONS  AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1  Support to the enterprise sector needs to be flexibly organized and demand-responsive. While
traditional centralized assistance may continue to be effective in some circumstances, it is generally better
to use competitive private service providers responding to the evolving needs of client enterprises, subject
to good overall project coordination. The main task is to stimulate this private services sector, upgrading
its capacity to respond to the demands of new and expanding private enterprises.
6.2  There is likely to be a window of time in which the public external benefits of intervention are
greatest - i.e. when the market is in its infancy and its development is constrained by uncertainty and lack
of information. The subsidy should be temporary and be phased out as the market takes off.
6.3  Grants should generally be for know-how and not for equipment. However there may be a case
for unbundling the know-how component of loans (e.g. feasibility studies, installation services and
follow-up expert services) for grant funding. A combined loan/grant package, either through a single
financial institution or through separate institutions, may be feasible provided safeguards can be put in
place to prevent perverse use of grants.
6.4  Whether the grant window is combined with lending, or free standing, best practice grant models
are needed. The MGF model, which is increasingly used in the Bank and outside, may be a solution but
needs to be carefully  justified and carefully designed. Above all, because the more decentralized is the
approach the greater the overall project coordination burden, it has to have competent management with
clear operating  procedures.
6.5  The sustainable skills-market-based approach to enterprise technical support may be conceived as
the parallel of the sustainable financial market-based approach to enterprise investment finance that has
been increasingly accepted by donor agencies over the past few years. 39
Figure 6  Parallel financing channels: Investment and Technical Services
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Investment Resources  Technical resources
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39  This  was  spelled  out in the Bank's  OP 8.30.22
Optimizing the Design of MGFs
6.6  MGFs have faced problems in terms of the selection procedure for subprojects,  management
complexity, and slow disbursement. To take advantage of the benefits that the MGF should be able to
provide, especially compared with central, supply-side interventions, they must address the problems of
the enterprise sector and be cost-effective. The following are some essential steps to be taken and
questions to be asked in setting up a MGF.
Step 1. Establish the economic needfor the project.
6.7  What is the public goods case for assistance? Is there a knowledge gap constraining provider and
user enterprises by increasing market uncertainty? a lack of internal management/technical know-how, a
lack of information about the use/value of particular outside business advisory services, a failure in
provision of advisory services? Is there an information gap constraining access to and granting of market
finance for technical services?
6.8  Are there other more important problems constraining enterprises -e.g. (a) projects may not be
bankable for reasons of uncompetitive technology or products; (b) Government regulations may prevent
or deter private sector entrants or harass existing companies; (c) tax, trade and exchange rate policy might
be putting more of a burden on local than foreign companies. These types of problems require a different
approach (e.g. macroeconomic and trade policy reform, regulatory and administrative reform). MGF
assistance in an adverse policy environment may be able to produce an output, but is likely to have a
weak or negligible market impact.
Step 2.Establish local ownership
6.9  A special effort is needed to bring the Govemment counterparts into the picture because this is an
unfamiliar and possibly controversial instrumenteo.  In particular an understanding should be reached on
(a) the rationale of the services market-building approach to enterprise assistance when managed
properly, (b) the need for autonomous, streamlined management and decision-making, (c) the
implications of grants for the Govemment budget, and (d) the internal controls and safeguards against
grant abuse, including last-resort Government oversight procedure.
Step 3. Develop a cost-effective design
The Fund managers role. The management team's terms of reference are key to the success of
the project. The team's principal business is to promote market knowledge. It must be proactive
in market-making, identifying and forecasting the needs and resources of firms, to upgrade them
according to a market development model, and to bring together the providers and the users
using various information media. The management team should split its resources and its grant
awards between supplier and users. The team should have general business consultant and
training skills and experience, but should use this experience to market the skills of the firms in
the market, not to provide its own formal advisory services. It should not be enmeshed in
monitoring and reporting requirements, but should be left to work towards generally agreed
targets.
40  The Armenia  Enterprise  Development  Project  MGF  comnponent  ran into difficulties  because,  despite  initial
agreement,  a new Government  backed  away  from  explicit  grants  (even  though  they were  not in cash)  because,
inter  alia,  there  was a concern  about  the perception  of potential  for corruption.  The fund  has  been very  slow  to
disburse  (12  projects  in three  years)  and  has thus  essentially  failed  to meet  the objectives  of opening  up the
market.23
*  Fund life. The life of the fund must have a built-in sunset provision, with its limit tied to
indicators of domestic market expansion and capacity development.
*  The fund size, costs and grant level; the size should be based on the estimated value of demand
expressed by firms over and above normal willingness to pay for services in the absence of a
fund, and the likely upgrading needs of new/existing service providers to meet demand. A larger
fund (with a broader eligible product range) may be advisable to minimize unit management
costs; fund management internal and outreach work program should maximize cost-
effectiveness. A simple norm is advisable for grants, reimbursing 50% of costs subject to
indicative maximum per firm (allowing multiple grants per firm).
*  Provider or user grants? Grants should be available for both sides of the market, to enable
service providers to provide the upgraded services demanded by new and upgraded users and to
enable a complete-market matchmaking approach by the facilitating entity and fund managers.
*  The types of services; the services should normally be strategic rather than operational, and they
should be defined on the basis of an up-front needs study, including both transactional services
(mainly addressing demand) and non-transactional services (mainly addressing supply). Concern
with economies of scale may justify opening up the fund to combine both training and
knowledge services for general business and specialized services for export/import and
international contracting, depending on the availability  of an appropriate combination of fund
expertise.
*  Governance and management; last-resort Government oversight should be included through a
policy committee with limited power (e.g. general fund policy, and approval of above-threshold
grants); autonomous fund management should be established either through a market entity (e.g.
a financial institution) or through a specialized fund management company, allowing autonomy
of decisions. Oversight by a quasi-public entity such as a Foundation may increase layers of
supervision if it has to report to a Government department, so its autonomy must be ensured.
*  The approval process; generally a reasonably streamlined FIFO process should be used, but it
should be subject to a set of carefully designed and clear enterprise and subproject eligibility
criteria including broad (flexible) product group targets.
*  Firm and subproject eligibility; the focus should generally be on SMEs and microenterprises 4 ';
both user-firms and service providers should be eligible; criteria should target (a) firms that
require but are not willing to pay for services; (b) product areas and technologies most likely to
generate spillover benefits; and (c) types of assistance most likely to stimulate demand for local
service provision. Grants should comprise a significant part of the business plan provided by
applicant firm. The development of eligibility criteria will require up-front research into the
sources of growth of the enterprise sector and functioning  of the market for services.
*  Managing Service provision; the fund manager should be responsible for developing a register
of local and foreign providers, conducting quality checks and giving upgrading grants to service
41  Some  MGFs  have  included  larger  firms.  However  evidence  (from  Mauritius)  suggests  that  the additionality
benefit  from  assisting  large firms  is especially  weak.  This  is not surprising  considering  that  large  firms  have  got
large  because  they  are already  well  aware  of how  to access  needed  resources  on their  own,  are accustomed  to
paying  for it, and  because  the available  grant  finance  is likely  to  be marginal  to their investment  expenditure
plans.providers according to its market development model; subject to limiting overhead cost of the
project, the manager should work actively with user firms to identify providers.
*  Performance indicators and criteria: output and impact indicators may be built into the project
design via a 'project score-sheet' 42;  monitorable deliverables and obligations of the fund
manager, service provider and user firms to provide performance data can be spelled out in
project agreements; performance measures require output indicators, institutional development
indicators and market development indicators 4 3. The indicators must allow for selection bias and
non-attributability.  Additionality indicators would require information on whether proposal
would have been undertaken in the absence of a grant, how it would be improved with grant
support, and what external (spillover) benefits can be expected from the subproject. It would also
require information on the quality and speed of development of the services market. However,
progress reporting should not become a bureaucratic burden on the fund manager that adversely
affects the objective of market-making.
Providers vs. Facilitators - Mixed projects
6.10  This paper has argued that facilitation and not service provision is the role of public support.
Nevertheless, many public sector service providers, sponsored both by donor organization and by
Governments, are in operation, and the question is how to best utilize their services to continue to transfer
know-how. One solution is to combine facilitation with provision.  One reason this may not work is the
possibility of a conflict of interest between the service provider role and the capacity building role that
tries to develop outside service providers. The way to avoid such a conflict may be to arrange service
provision so that it (i) focuses only on specialized types of expertise not likely to be available locally in
the near future (e.g. advanced information technology services, corporate finance, or export facilitation in
new markets), (ii) adopts a training and dissemination program for such expertise in the course of its
provision, and (iii) phases out its service provision pari passu with the development of local capacity,
according to a timetable and a market development model agreed by both sides and the donor
organization.
6.11  Combination provider/facilitator projects would include a management team that had the skills to
both provide these services and manage a market facilitation/ development fund, accessible by both
providers and user firms. As the provider role is phased out the team would be adjusted to a pure market
development fund management role, which would itself be phased out according to a market development
timetable.
42  This  is being developed  for the proposed  Mozambique  Private  Sector  Development  project.
43  The  Donor  Committee  on Small  Enterprise  development  is supporting  work  on a Performance  Measurement
Framework  for BDS which  would  develop  ways  of measuring  market  development  and  sustainability.25
ANNEX 1
COMPLETED,  ONGOING  AND PLANNED  MATCHING  GRANT SCHEMES  FOR
ENTERPRISE  SUPPORT
Country  Project Name  Fund Value  44 Start Date  Close  Date
COMPL  ETFD
ARGENTINA  Export Development Project  32.0  1995  2000
INDIA  Engg Export Development  20.0  1986  1991
INDIA  Export development project  20.0  1989  1996
INDONESIA  1st Export Development Project  5.7  1986  1992
KENYA  Export development program  2.0  1991  1995
MAURITIUS  TA Competitiveness  2.7  1994  1999
COLOMBIA  Export Development Project  36.6  1993  cancelled
ONGOING
ARMENIA  Enterprise Development Project  3.5  1997  2002
BANGLADESH  Export Diversification  Project  15.8  1999  2003
JAMAICA  Private Investment and Export  4.4  1994  2001
MEXICO  Knowledge & Innovation Project  30.0  1998
SOUTH  AFRICA  Industrial Competitiveness Project  24.4  1997  2001
TrUNISIA  Export  Development  Project  13.5  1999
UGANDA  Pvt Sec Competitiveness Project  3.0  1996  2001
ZAMBIA  Enterprise Development Project  2.5  1997  2002
ZIMBABWE  Enterprise Development Project  0.42  1996  2001
PLANNED
MOZAMBIQUE  Private Sector Development Project  2000
44  MGF  component of IBRD/IDA  loan (excluding  local  contribution  and cofinancing)26
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